If this were true, DRM would be trivial and made with easy to implement things like "detect if user right clicks, and pop up a message saying 'sorry copying not allowed'".
DRM is not that - a massive technical effort has gone into implementing DRM deep in system architectures. Modifications have been done across every layer of the stack, across hundreds of companies of differing goals.
You only go to that much effort, at that great a cost, if you are hoping for DRM to actually work, rather than just be a thing you can hold up in court and say "we tried to protect it your honor, we really did".
The "level of security" (~tech effort) is the main competitive selling point when DRM-vendors lobby studios for endorsement. The studios are probably partly being sold a pipe dream of "unbreakable DRM", but the person you responded to also has a point.
Weak or nonexistent DRM reduces the provable malicious intent of a ripper. The more effort it takes to break a DRM, the less likely it seems that you don't understand that what you are doing is wrong.
DRM is not that - a massive technical effort has gone into implementing DRM deep in system architectures. Modifications have been done across every layer of the stack, across hundreds of companies of differing goals.
You only go to that much effort, at that great a cost, if you are hoping for DRM to actually work, rather than just be a thing you can hold up in court and say "we tried to protect it your honor, we really did".