Well, it's similar to when a company tries to stop brute force by blindly blocking people who try 10 invalid passwords, but they have a CSRF on the login page (cross site request forgery). The problem is that I can craft a page to make a POST to their login page with invalid passwords repeatedly via ajax, and lock out legitimate users with a spam campaign pointing to my page on their user base. It seems far fetched until you consider something global like the internet. There are two ways I could see this failing on a global scale:
- Attackers figure out something similar to the attack described above and can entice large amounts of users to visit a page that repeatedly fires at something like s3.aws.com or w/e, the user is unaware but they're essentially DDoSing s3.aws.com via attacker.com's webpage, and in point 2 they would be banned.
- DRDoS is similar to whats described above, but in point 2 it kind of stands alone as the biggest issue. it can be mitigated to a certain level by ISP's, but not entirely. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack#Refle...) . Point 2 would actually help attackers poison DNS.
- Attackers figure out something similar to the attack described above and can entice large amounts of users to visit a page that repeatedly fires at something like s3.aws.com or w/e, the user is unaware but they're essentially DDoSing s3.aws.com via attacker.com's webpage, and in point 2 they would be banned.
- DRDoS is similar to whats described above, but in point 2 it kind of stands alone as the biggest issue. it can be mitigated to a certain level by ISP's, but not entirely. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack#Refle...) . Point 2 would actually help attackers poison DNS.