> I don't think that's accurate. There is a position, albeit more in the academy than on the bench, that holds that judges should only in the rarest of circumstances hold that the actions of the other branches are unconstitutional. Scalia can't fairly be described as being an adherent of that school.
My understanding was that Scalia himself explicitly claimed to be following this philosophy. What makes you say otherwise?
The evidence says otherwise. Scalia voted to strike down laws or held executive actions unconstitutional many times over the course of his career. At some point "the rarest of circumstances" has to have some bite. I'm sure he would have argued that he was compelled to do so by the text of the constitution and by the flagrant unconstitutionality of those laws/actions, but I don't think that's a good answer. He may have wished that circumstances would have allowed him to be an avatar of judicial restraint but regardless that's not what happened.
My understanding was that Scalia himself explicitly claimed to be following this philosophy. What makes you say otherwise?